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  A number of recent empirical studies have cast doubt on the “modernization theory” of 
democratization, which posits that increases in income are conducive to increases in democracy 
levels.  This doubt stems mainly from the fact that while a strong positive correlation exists 
between income and democracy levels, the relationship disappears when one controls for country 
fixed effects.  This raises the possibility that the correlation in the data reflects a third causal 
characteristic, such as institutional quality.  In this paper, we reexamine the robustness of the 
income-democracy relationship.  We extend the research on this topic in two dimensions:  first, 
we make use of newer income data, which allows for the construction of larger samples with 
more within-country observations.  Second, we concentrate on panel estimation methods that 
explicitly allow for the fact that the primary measures of democracy are censored with 
substantial mass at the boundaries, or binary censored variables. Our results show that when one 
uses  both the new income data available and a properly non linear estimator, a statistically 
significant positive income-democracy relationship is robust to the inclusion of country fixed 
effects. 
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The income-democracy correlation is the cornerstone of the “modernization theory”. The theory 
claims a causal relation: democratic regimes are created and consolidated in affluent societies [e.g. Lipset 
(1959), Przeworski et al (1997), Barro (1999, Epstein et al (2006)].  Higher incomes reduce the intensity 
of conflict over the distribution of income, and thereby give way to democratic institutions that 
discourage expropriation and support redistributive fiscal policies under the rule of law [e.g.Benhabib and 
Rustichini (1996), Benhabib and Przeworski (2004)].  Alternatively, citizens of wealthier countries with 
high levels of human capital and high incomes may be more effective at creating and sustaining 
democratic institutions [e.g. Glaeser, et al (2004)].  Advocates of institutional explanations, however, 
view the causality in reverse: good democratic institutions that limit governments and protect property 
rights are conducive to economic growth [e.g. Acemoglu, et al (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Rodrik et al (2004)].  
In well-known recent papers Acemoglu, et al [AJRY (2008), (2009)] cast doubt on the robustness 
of the cross-country empirical relationship between income and democracy.  They demonstrate that the 
income-democracy relationship observed in the data is not robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects 
that capture various institutional differences across countries.
1  Using Freedom House and Polity 
measures of democracy in a cross-country panel between 1960 and 2000, Acemoglu, et al conclude that 
with country fixed effects, the relationship between income and democracy disappears.  They also obtain 
similar results for IV estimation.
2  They extend their findings to a binary democracy measure used by 
Przeworski, et al (2000), and obtain similar results.  
This paper re-establishes the correlation of income and democracy even after controlling for fixed 
effects.  Our analysis confronts two primary issues: first, more and better-measured data on both income 
and democracy has become available since the publication of AJRY (2008).  This development is crucial 
because the inclusion of country fixed effects reduces inference to that based on within-country variation 
                                                            
1 For an earlier use of fixed effects in this context see Londregan and Poole (1997). 
 
2 AJRY (2008) instruments for income include lagged savings and weighted income changes of trading partners. 2 
 
in the data.  However, as we show below, the initial Penn World Tables 6.1 (PWT 6.1) sample has data 
for shorter time spans than those available in either the newer Penn World Tables 6.3 data set [Heston, et 
al, (2009)] (PWT 6.3), or the alternative Maddison (2003) data set.  As the small within-country sample 
may preclude a statistically-significant relationship between income and democracy, we use the larger 
PWT 6.3 and Maddison data sets to capture more of the variance of democracy in our estimations. 
Second, the measures of democracy used in AJRY, based on Freedom House and Marshall 
Jaggers Polity IV (2004) samples are discrete and bounded, violating the maintained assumptions under 
OLS.  We respond to this issue by using either a two-sided Tobit specification or the double-censoring 
specification of Alan, et al (2008).   We also introduce a one-side censored measure of democracy – the 
Vanhanen Index of Democratization [Vanhanen (1990) and Vanhanen (2000)] –. Finally, we also 
examine a binary variable, such as that proposed by Alvarez, et al (1996) and Przeworski, et al (2000) – 
henceforth called Democracy/Dictatorship (DD) – and use conditional and unconditional Logit 
specifications to obtain estimates.
3  Additionally, for the four measures of democracy – Freedom House, 
Polity, Index of Democratization and DD – we also use the Wooldridge (2005) estimator (WE). This 
estimator generalizes the Chamberlain (1980) estimator used by AJRY (2009) and parameterizes the fixed 
effects as well as the initial conditions in a dynamic panel.   
The remainder of this paper is divided into 5 sections.  Section 2 introduces the data used in our 
study.  Section 3 introduces our empirical methodology.  Section 4 discusses our results.  Section 5 
conducts some robustness tests.  Lastly, Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Data 
2.1 Measurement of income and democracy 
We consider a variety of income and democracy measures.  First, to replicate the results in AJRY 
(2008), we use the same version of the Penn World Tables (6.1) [Heston et al (2002)] that they used.  We 
                                                            
3 See Corvalan (2010) for other nonlinear estimations with binary democracy 3 
 
then use the newer 2009 version of the Penn World Tables (6.3) that has greater coverage (189 countries 
vs 168 in PWT 6.1), and whose times series extend farther for most countries.
4  
We also use the Maddison Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP covering 
202 countries [Maddison (2003)]
5.  We demonstrate that our Maddison data set tends to have greater 
coverage per country, facilitating the estimation of within-country variations.  This allows us to evaluate 
the robustness of our results with the Penn World Tables data. 
We next turn to the measurement of democracy.  Much disagreement exists about the proper way 
to measure this variable (see Elkins (2000), Munk and Verkuilen (2002), Coppedge, et al (2008), and 
Cheibub, et al (2009) for recent discussions).  A primary concern is whether democracy should be treated 
as a dichotomous, ordinal, or continuous variable.  Bollen (1990) argues that the intensity of democracy is 
continuous by nature, and that a dichotomous index may result in a crude pooling of heterogeneous 
political regimes into a single categorization.  Alternatively, Przeworski, et al (2000) reject the notion of a 
continuum, claiming that a country is either democratic or not. 
We consider four alternative measures of the degree of democracy:  First, we use the Freedom 
House Political Rights Index (FH), which allocates higher scores to countries that are closer to a set of 
characteristics that would be associated with a functioning democracy.  Countries are coded with an 
integer scale between 1 and 7, corresponding to full democracy and autocracy respectively.  This is the 
democracy variable favored in AJRY (2008).  In the spirit of maximizing the availability of within-
country data, we follow Barro (1999) and AJRY (2008) in augmenting the index with the Bollen (2001) 
                                                            
4 The earlier Penn World Tables have not been exempt from criticism.  These criticisms point to the substantial 
degree of variability across different versions of the Penn World Tables [e.g. Johnson, et al (2009)] and to 
misgivings about purchasing power parity adjustments [Bergeijk (1998) and Johnson, et al (2009)]. In response, 
PWT 6.3 includes a new variable, RGDPL2 that should exhibit less variability across data revisions. In the interest 
of maximizing the comparability of our results with those in AJRY (2008), we report results for the RGDPCH 
variable below. However, we obtain almost identical results when using the RGDPL2 variable with the PWT 6.3 
data set instead.  This is unsurprising as the correlation between RGDPL2 and RGDPCH in our sample is 99%. 
These results are available upon request.  
 




data for 1950 – 1965, and also normalize the index to take values between 0 and 1.
6  This index ranks 
countries on that basis of a set of criteria, for example whether a country holds free and fair elections or 
not.
7 
A notable feature of the FH index, which may be problematic for statistical inference, either with 
or without the inclusion of the Bollen data, is the substantial share of observations at either extreme, as 
shown in Figure 1.  Almost 1/5 of the observations are coded as full democracies.  This leaves the 
distribution of this variable bimodal.  Moreover, a majority of these full democracies are high income 
countries which remain full democracies throughout our sample.  
We also use the Marshall and Jaggers (2004) POLITY2 index (PI2).  The POLITY2 index 
measures the difference between the Polity Democracy and Autocracy indices.  It ranges from a score of -
10 to 10, and represents a country’s constraints on executive power through five indicators:  (1) intensity 
of political competition, 2) regulation of political participation, (3) competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, (4) Openness of executive recruitment, and (5) the constraints it places on its chief executive.  
This variable is the same as the POLITY variable used in AJRY (2008) and AJRY (2009), with values 
included to account for periods “interruption”, “interregnum”, and “transition”.
8  It would be 
inappropriate to exclude these transition periods from the sample, as the inclusion of country fixed effects 
relies heavily on the transition periods for within-country variation in the data.  As can be seen in Figure 
1, the Polity2 data is also bimodal, with a substantial share of the countries in the sample designated as 
full democracies.   
                                                            
6  The data is available for four years: 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965. As in Barro (1999) and AJRY (2008), we use 
1972 Freedom House figures for 1970. 
 
7 The FH index includes three questions about the electoral process, four questions on the extent of political 
pluralism and participation, and three questions on the functioning of government.  For more details, see 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2006. 
 
8 The POLITY IV project manual [Marshall and Jaggers (2007)] indentifies interruptions as periods of foreign 
occupation or “short-lived” attempts at creating ethnic or religious federations, interregnums as periods of political 
authority collapse, and transitions as periods between to substantially different political regimes [Plümper and 
Neumayer (2010)]. For interruptions the POLITY II data set treats the data as missing as does POLITY; for 
interregnums, POLITY II assigns a neutral score while for transitions, POLITY II conducts linear interpolations 
between beginning and ending periods of the transition period. Effectively then, POLITY II differs from POLITY in 
distinguishing between interregnum and transition episodes and in smoothing changes along transition episodes. 5 
 
We also use Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization  [Vanhanen (1990) and (2000)].  This index is 
a composite measure of on voter participation rates and the intensity of election contestation, based on the 
share of votes captured by the opposition party (or parties).  These measures are multiplied together to 
yield an overall index number.  A country is considered a democracy if participation rates are at least 
10%, the share of the opposition party is at least 30%, and the overall index number is sufficiently high.
9  
Unlike the FH and PI2 measures, the Vanhanen Index is not censored on the right hand side (see Figure 
1).  As such, the Vanhanen indices for wealthy democracies are still exhibiting gains in democracy: 
countries in Vanhanen Index increased their mean democracy from 9.7 to 16.5 from 1960 to 2000 while 
the subset of those countries which are democracies according to Polity2 index increased their mean from 
26.1 to 33.0.  Since the Vanhanen index is not censured on the right, the data is better able to track and 
indentify an income-democracy relationship, if one exists. 
  Finally, we consider a dichotomous index of democracy and dictatorship.  We use the 
Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) measure introduced by Alvarez et al (1996) and extended by Cheibub et al 
(2010).  This index gives a country a value of 1 at time t if it is considered a democracy and 0 otherwise.  
A regime is classified as a democracy if the following four conditions are all met:  (1) the chief executive 
is chosen in a popular election, or by a popularly-elected legislature, (2) the legislature is popularly 
elected, (3) there is more than one political party competing in elections, and (4) an alternation in power 
under electoral rules identical to the ones that led to the incumbent taking power must have taken place. 
We note that all democracy measures above are highly correlated, as the correlation coefficient 
between any pair of measures exceeds 0.8 (see Table 1).  
        
2.2 Resulting sample Panels 
                                                            
9 The overall index number is calculated as the share of participation times the share of the opposition party times 
100, so that countries just meeting the minimum criteria in both categories would obtain an overall score of 3.0. The 
minimum threshold chosen for the overall index to indicate democracy is designated by Vanhanen (2000) as 5.0. 6 
 
Our base sample includes observations taken every fifth year from 1955 through 2000.
10  We also 
examine 1 and 10 year panels over the same time period.
11  As some countries received independence 
during this period, our base sample is unbalanced.  5 year intervals and the inclusion of lagged values are 
used to minimize serial correlation difficulties in the data as much as possible.  
The differences between the panels for the five year data set using different measures of income 
and democracy are summarized in Table 2.  We consistently obtain a larger sample when using the Penn 
World Tables 6.3 data set rather than the PWT 6.1 data set.  For each of the three democracy measures we 
consider, the number of observations increases substantially, and number of observations per country 
does as well.  We also observe an increase in the coefficient of variation for the democracy measure for 
all three democracy measures, although the percent of observations with changes in the democracy 
measure decreases modestly.  In terms of country characteristics, the countries in our PWT 6.3 panels 
have higher per capita income and lower average democracy values for all three democracy measures. 
Our panels using the Maddison data set are all also universally larger than their PWT 6.1 
counterparts for any of our democracy measures.  However, the relative sizes of the panels we obtain 
using the PWT 6.3 or Maddison data sets varies across democracy measures.  The largest panel we obtain 
is that using the Maddison income data and the Polity2 democracy measure, with 2052 observations, 
almost double the amount we obtain with the Polity2 democracy measure and the PWT 6.1 income data.  
That panel also has the largest average number of observations within country, 13.07, which bodes well 
for our ability to identify the income democracy relationship in the presence of country fixed effects.  
Overall, our use of alternative measures of income and democracy results in substantively larger 
samples, with increased within-country observations.  Moreover, there is reason to believe that these new 
panels will be more informative, as the coefficient of variation in all of the democracy measures 
                                                            
10 Reported results were robust to the inclusion of averages over five year periods instead.  Five year periods are 
used to mitigate serial correlation problems. 
 
11 Following AJRY, our period of analysis is from 1960 to 2000.  For the 5 year sample, the first lagged observation 
is from 1955.  For the 10 year sample, however, the first lagged observation is from 1950.   7 
 
considered increases when one goes from the original PWT 6.1 data set to either the PWT 6.3 or 
Maddison alternatives.  
  
III. Estimation Methodology 
3.1 Specification 
Consider the following specification  
  11 2 1 log it it it t i it dd Y          (1) 
where  it d  and  1 log it Y   are democracy and log of GDP per capita for country i at period t respectively,  t 
and  i   represent time and country fixed effects respectively, and  it  is a disturbance term, assumed to be 
clustered by country. 
  The primary question stressed in the literature is the robustness of a statistically significant 
positive coefficient estimate for  2  in the presence of the country fixed effects,  i  .  There are strong 
reasons to believe that conditioning for cross-country differences is warranted.  Country effects -- such as 
culture, religion, and the endowment of natural resources -- may indeed affect both democracy and 
income.   As argued by AJRY (2008), this requires the inclusion of a fixed effects estimator that isolates 
within-country changes in the data.  
  However, the inclusion of fixed effects in equation (1), combined with the other variables, makes 
it difficult to establish the significance of income in the data.  For our base specification below, the R-
squared is about 0.70 with only lagged democracy included.  Introducing time and country dummies 
eliminates all common trends and cross-country correlations, further increasing the R-squared to 0.81.
12  
The inclusion of all of these controls leaves little remaining variability to be explained, and therefore 
heightens the importance of considering the role of income in a data-rich panel. 
                                                            
12 Results are for five-year panels 1955-2000 using FH democracy and PWT 6.3 income data. 8 
 
The linear specification (1) above however would not be suitable in the presence of our censored 
democracy measures especially since a substantial share of our sample falls on the boundaries.
13  For this 
reason we move to non-linear Tobit and Logit estimations, as well as nonlinear dynamic panel methods 




To take into account the non-linearities inherent in censored variables, we first turn to tobit 
estimation.  However, even under a tobit specification our estimates may be inconsistent because of the 
incidental parameter problem.  Because the specification is non-linear, fixed effects cannot be omitted 
through differencing and must be estimated from the same sample.  As a result, an increase in the number 
of countries in our sample necessitates the estimation of these new parameters.  This is inconsistent for a 
given length of within-country time series, and in turn can bias the other parameter estimates.  Alan, et al 
(2008) provide moment conditions for a two-sided censored panel in the presence of fixed effects.  We 
therefore also report the results of this approach using their estimator, termed “Two-sided” below.  
Another source of concern is that our sample is a dynamic panel which includes lagged values of 
democracy.  For the linear case, this problem can be treated with panel-GMM, such as the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) method used by AJRY (2008).
15  However, our nonlinear specification presents a more 
challenging problem, as we cannot use differencing to eliminate the impact of country fixed effects.  
Taking the initial condition of the dependent variable as independent of unobserved heterogeneity will 
                                                            
13 For binary variables a linear probability model would yield consistent estimates provided estimated probability 
coefficients are in [0, 1] but otherwise a nonlinear correction for estimates outside this interval would also be 
required. 
 
14 The use of non linear estimation methods for democracy is not new: see Przeworski et al (2000) for the use of 
Probit with DD and Epstein et al (2006) for the use of a Tobit estimator with POLITY2 data. Also Barro (1999) 
suggests that the use of non linear estimation would improve his approach.  
 
15 Bobba and Coviello (2007) and Castelló-Climent (2008) also conduct system-GMM estimates of censored 
democracy variables, finding a significant positive relationship between education and democracy. 9 
 
bias estimates in dynamic panels that are short in the time dimension.  A number of authors have 
addressed this problem with various methods, including Heckman and MacCurdy (1980), Heckman 
(1981), Honoré (1993), Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000), and Wooldridge (2005).  In this paper, we follow 
Wooldridge (2005), assuming that country fixed effects can be specified as a linear function of the mean 
sample value of the observable independent variables, the initial condition for the lagged dependent 
variables and  country specific random effects.
16  This approach is a generalization of the Chamberlain 
(1980) methodology used by AJRY (2008).
17 
For our dichotomous democracy measure, we use unconditional and conditional logit estimation.  
Both of these methodologies have strengths and weaknesses.  Unconditional logit allows for the 
estimation of probabilities, but is not a T-consistent estimator, due to the incidental parameters problem.
 18  
Conditional logit addresses this problem, but restricts us to investigating the statistical significance of the 
independent variables.  We deal with dynamic panel issues for the dichotomous measure by again using 
the Wooldridge (2005) method described above. 
 
IV.   Results 
4.1   Censored democracy measures 
  The results using the FH measure of democracy are shown in Table 3.  First, we demonstrate that 
our results are consistent with those in AJRY (2008) for OLS estimation.  With country fixed effects 
excluded, we obtain positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates for lagged income values.  
                                                            
16 One potential difficulty with this approach is that some of the initial conditions for the lagged dependent variables 
may lie on the boundary of the interval to which they are restricted, in turn restricting the range of the country 
specific fixed effects. 
 
17 As a robustness check, we also use the Chamberlain (1980) methodology with similar results.  
 
18 Corvalan (2010) provides a first-order correction for the incidental parameter bias that arises in estimation using 
an adjustment from Hanh and Kuersteiner (2004) and Fernandez-Val (2009).  His estimates are very similar to those 
reported below.  
 10 
 
This is true for all three income measure samples.  However, with fixed effects included, these results 
disappear, as all coefficient estimates are now smaller and statistically insignificant.  We therefore verify 
that under OLS, the significance of lagged income on democracy levels is not robust to the inclusion of 
country fixed effects.  We therefore switch to tobit and Two-Sided Estimators for censored data (see Alan 
et al (2008)). 
Our results using either the tobit or the Two-Sided Estimator are still insignificant when we 
estimate income using the PWT 6.1 data set to measure income.  However, we obtain quite different 
results for both the PWT 6.3 and Maddison income panels.  For both specifications, coefficient estimates 
on income are larger, with income entering positive at least at a 5% confidence level for both the PWT 
6.3 and the Maddison panels using the TOBIT estimation method, and at a 5% level for the Maddison 
data set using the Two-Sided Estimator method. 
Note that the sample sizes are much increased using both alternative measures of income for all 
estimation methods.  For this reason, we conclude that the relationship between income and democracy 
regains its statistical significance in the presence of country fixed effects when we use both the newer 
richer data sets and the nonlinear estimator appropriate for the censored measures of democracy. 
In terms of the magnitude of the effects, consider that the mean value of lagged income in our 
sample is 8.36 for the PWT 6.3 data set and 7.83 for the Maddison data set, with standard deviations of 
1.11 and 1.06 respectively.  It follows that our point estimates indicate that a two standard deviation 
increase in lagged income would result in an increase of democracy of 0.16 for the PWT 6.3 sample and 
0.22 for the Maddison samples.  For example, beginning with the mean FH score of 0.51, a two standard 
deviation increase in lagged income would be predicted to increase the democracy score to 0.67 and 0.73 
respectively.  Such changes correspond to substantial increases in the level of democracy. 
We now turn to our results with the Wooldridge estimator that also deals with the introduction of 
lagged democracy in our specifications.  Lagged income is significant at a confidence level of 5% using 11 
 
both the PWT6.3 and Maddison data sets for income, with point estimates similar to the ones in the tobit 
and Two sided specifications.  
We repeat the exercise using both the Polity2 and Vanhanen democracy measures.  The results 
are shown in Table 4.  These results are very similar to those we obtain with FH.  For the Polity2 
democracy measure and either income measure, lagged income enters positively and is statistically 
significant under OLS estimation when country fixed effects are excluded, but not when they are 
included.  However, coefficient estimates under tobit and Two-Sided Estimators are statistically 
significant at least at a 10% confidence level for both the PWT 6.3 and the Maddison income measures, 
with the Maddison panel coming in at 5% significance under tobit.  The magnitudes of our coefficient 
estimates are also similar to those that we obtained using the FH measure of democracy.  For the 
Wooldridge estimator with Polity2 data, lagged income is significant at a confidence level of 1% using 
both the PWT6.3, and at 5% level using Maddison data sets for income, again with point estimates 
comparable to those in our tobit and two sided specifications. 
Next, we turn to the results with the Vanhanen democracy measure.  In contrast to the democracy 
measures censored on both sides, the coefficient for lagged income, with fixed effects included, is now 
positive and significant at a 1% confidence level.  With both the unconditional tobit and the Two-Sided 
Estimator the coefficient of lagged income is positive and significant at a 5% confidence level for both 
measures of income.  For the Wooldridge estimator with the Vanhanen measure of democracy lagged 
income is significant at a confidence level of 5% using both the PWT6.3, and at 1% level using the 
Maddison data set for income. 
The OLS results with the Vanhannen measure differ from the OLS results for the other censored 
democracy measures: the significance of lagged income is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects.  
This may be because the Vanhannen measure is censored only on the left, and is better able to capture the 
variability of democracy among countries with high measures of democracy.  12 
 
 
4.2 Dichotomous measures of democracy 
  The results for the dichotomous measures of democracy (DD) are shown in Table 5.  The OLS 
results are repeated for completeness and are comparable to the results for dichotomous democracy 
measures obtained by AJRY (2009).  Under a logit specification, lagged income enters positively at least 
a 5% confidence level for all income measures under both conditional and unconditional logit estimation.  
The marginal effects for unconditional logit are 0.682 and 0.848, with estimated standard errors of  0.304 
and 0.250 for PWT6.3 and Maddison, respectively.  The estimated coefficients indicate that the presence 
or absence of democracy is extremely sensitive to income:  one standard deviation increase in measured 
income under the Maddison data set would move the democracy measure almost from 0 to 1. 
For the Wooldridge estimator with the DD democracy measure, lagged income is significant at a 
confidence level of 5% using both the PWT6.3 and Maddison data sets for income.  In this case, marginal 
effects are reduced on average to 0.2, meaning that a two standard deviation increase in income would 
increase the probability of being a democracy by about 40 percent.   
  Note that except for the sample using the Wooldridge estimator, the samples for our 
unconditional and conditional logit specifications for dichotomous democracy measures are effectively 
much smaller.  This is because the country fixed effects completely account for the dichotomous 
democracy measure for those countries whose values do not change.  With few exceptions, affluent 
countries tend to be measured as democracies throughout our sample.  On the other hand, the Wooldridge 
estimator proxies for fixed effects using a function generated from observable data.  This explains why 
the coefficients for unconditional and conditional logit are much larger than those obtained with the 
Wooldridge estimator. 
   13 
 
V. Robustness Checks        
5.1 Alternative samples and frequencies 
  Next we consider a number of alternative specifications and samples to evaluate the robustness of 
our results.  We first repeat the results using 1-year data for all our measures of democracy: the FH, 
Polity2,  Vanhanen and DD dichotomous measures, and the PWT 6.3 and Maddison measures of income. 
Following AJRY(2008) we include 5 lags of democracy and income in the RHS of (1), and we report the 
F-statistic for the join significance of the 5 lags.  As the 1-year data the panel is large enough in the time 
dimension, we report only the non linear estimations: unconditional Tobit for the case of censored 
democracy and unconditional logit for the case of dichotomous measures.    
We next consider longer time intervals, estimating our sample over 10 year windows.  We report 
the same nonlinear estimations as in the 1-year case, but also the Wooldridge estimation that corrects for 
the effect of initial conditions.  
Finally we remove from our original samples some particular subsets of countries that can be 
driving our results.  First, it is plausible that the democratization occurring in the socialist countries 
during this period was exceptional, and therefore not suitable for pooling with the rest of our sample.
19  
Second, Oil Exporters’ countries may also be exceptional since large Oil reserve has been found to be 
detrimental for the formation of democratic institutions (see Ross 2001).
 20  We therefore experiment with 
a sample that excludes Oil exporting countries. 
Our results are reported in table 6.  The qualitative annual results are quite similar to those we 
obtained with our five year samples.  Our variables of interest, the 5 lags of income, are jointly significant 
at a 5% confidence level using the FH and POLITY2 measures of democracy and the Maddison data, but 
                                                            
19 The set of socialist countries are the countries defined as Marxist in 1982 by Lenski, see Bollen (1994) for a 
description.  
 
20 The set of oil exporters countries are the 10 countries with higher oil export to GDP ratio, according to Ross 
(2001). The number of ten countries was chosen arbitrarily, but results are robust to other numbers.  14 
 
is insignificant using the PWT6.3 data for FH and significant at 10% for POLITY2.  For the Vanhanen 
democracy index, significance is at 10 % only for Maddison.  Finally, for DD democracy measure, lagged 
income is significant at a 1% level for both measures of income.  Overall, our lagged income is significant 
for 6 out of 8 specifications.    
For 10-year time periods, lagged income is positive and significant at a 10% confidence level for 
14 out of 16 specifications and significant at a 5% level for 11 of the 16 specifications.  
The results with socialist nations excluded are in general stronger than those that we obtain for 
our full sample.  For all of our 12 specifications lagged income is positive and significant at least a 10% 
confidence level, and in 15 out of 16 at a 5% confidence level or better.  Once we exclude Oil exporters, 
lagged income is significant for all specifications except for the FH measure of democracy which is only 
significant for the Maddison income data.  Overall, 14 out of 16 cases have significance at 10 % and 10 
cases at 5% or better. 
 
5.2 Additional covariates 
  As emphasized by Lipset (1959), education is also considered an important aspect of 
modernization.  An educated citizenry may constitute a pressure group for democracy and facilitate the 
functioning of democratic processes.  To further investigate the role of education in fostering democracy 
as a competing explanation to income, we follow Barro (1999), Glaeser, et al (2004), and Acemoglu, et al 
(2005), by introducing lagged years of schooling as an explanatory variable.  We also include a measure 
of population as a control, as in AJRY (2008).
21 
                                                            
21 AJRY (2008) also consider a group of variables termed “age structure,” which consists of median age, as well as 
the share of the population of ages 0-15, 15-30, 30-45, and 45-60.  Introducing these variables into our specification 
along with country fixed effects reduced the significance of income, which continued to enter at statistically 
significant levels using either the Vanhanen measure or DD measures, but not for the FH or POLITY2 measures.  
 15 
 
  Our results are shown in Table 7.  It can be seen that income almost universally continues to enter 
positively with education and population included, either together or separately, for all four of our 
democracy measures.
22  Income enters significantly at least at a 10% confidence level for 21 of the 24 
specifications we report.  The coefficient estimates we obtain are also similar those we obtained above 
without including the covariates.  
  The performances of the covariates are not as strong.  Average education in the population only 
enters significantly at least at the same 10% confidence level in only 4 of the 16 specifications in which it 
is included.  For those specifications in which it does enter significantly, it takes its expected positive 
sign.  Population does slightly better, entering significantly negative in 7 of the 16 specifications in which 
it is included.  In all of these, it takes a negative sign, providing weak evidence that larger populations, 
holding all else equal, are less conducive to democratization.  Overall, it appears that only income 




  The introduction of fixed effects sets a high bar for establishing that income is a significant 
explanatory variable for democracy in cross-country panel data.  Our results suggest that the weak 
evidence for a causal empirical relationship between income and democracy found in the existing 
literature stemmed from two sources:  A smaller, and perhaps less-accurately-measured panel of data for 
income, and the lack of the use of an appropriate estimator for the censored dependent measure of 
democracy.  When we correct for both of these, we consistently find that lagged income is a positive and 
statistically significant variable in explaining democracy.  There were some exceptions, but it appears that 
the bulk of the evidence favors of a statistical relationship between income and democratization. 
                                                            
22 Results in Table 7 are reported for Maddison income measures. Results with PWT 6.3 income data are reported in 
appendix table A7. 16 
 
  It should be stressed that both the larger sample sizes and the use of appropriate estimators were 
needed to regain a statistically significant relationship between income and democracy in the presence of 
fixed effects.  As such, earlier studies were unable of finding this relationship with the older versions of 
the data.  Only when the newer Penn World data, or the Maddison data, was combined with the proper 
non-linear estimators did the empirical relationship reappear in the presence of country fixed effects.  
Both of these corrections seem compelling; the dependent variables used in the study are indeed censored 
on both sides, with a substantial share of the data at the boundaries.  Moreover, the creators of the Penn 
Tables themselves argue that the newer data set is superior, not just in terms of coverage, but also in the 
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Figure 1: Histogram of Measures of democracy: FH Bollen, Polity2, and Vahanen 
 
Note: Histograms for Polity2, Freedom House, Bollen and Vanhanen measures of democracy. 
Observations are for each 5 years from 1955 to 2000 for Polity2 and Vanhanen. For Freedom House, 
observations are from 1970 to 2000, and we use 1972 Freedom House figures for 1970. Bollen includes 




























































    Note: Correlation coefficient estimates for four alternative democracy measures. 
  
TABLE 1: Correlations
FH PI2 VAN DD
FH 1
PI2 0.88 1
VAN 0.82 0.84 1
DD 0.82 0.85 0.81 1
Note: 1241 observations in the 5y sample23 
 
































Freedom House Penn 61 758 37% 63% 4.99 0.558 65 6709
Freedom House Penn 63 1151 36% 61% 6.26 0.525 71 9641
Freedom House Maddison 1000 37% 62% 6.25 0.478 77 5562
Polity2 Penn 61 1054 31% 77% 7.64 0.564 66 5671
Polity2 Penn 63 1375 30% 77% 8.65 0.538 70 8075
Polity2 Maddison 2052 29% 78% 13.07 0.517 70 4150
Vanhanen Penn 61 1129 29% 71% 7.37 0.285 102 5997
Vanhanen Penn 63 1360 34% 66% 7.43 0.255 111 8231
Vanhanen Maddison 1902 35% 65% 11.96 0.189 136 3893
DD Penn 61 1136 8% ‐ 7.42 0.482 104 5937
DD Penn 63 1554 7% ‐ 8.40 0.454 110 8496




TABLE 3: Results with Freedom House measure of democracy 
 
Note: Estimation results using PWT 6.1, PWT 6.3, and Maddison income data as indicated, with Freedom 
House democracy measure. Estimation by ordinary least squares, with country fixed effects excluded and 
included, Tobit regression, Two-sided censored panel estimator, and Wooldridge dynamic panel estimator 
as indicated. See text for details. Standard errors in parentheses: errors are robust and clustered by 
countries for all estimations except Two sided. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% confidence 
level, ** at 5% confidence level, and *** at 10% confidence level. Country and time fixed effect 
estimates suppressed, but available upon request. 
 
  
penn 6.1 penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.1 penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.1 penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.1 penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.1 penn 6.3 maddison
dem (t‐1) 0.707*** 0.802*** 0.767*** 0.383*** 0.398*** 0.428*** 0.472*** 0.497*** 0.534*** 0.469*** 0.490*** 0.514*** 0.744*** 0.773*** 0.812***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
inc (t‐1) 0.072*** 0.037*** 0.055*** 0.011 0.026 0.046 0.062 0.071** 0.106*** 0.033 0.047 0.075** 0.053 0.066** 0.076**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
inc(mean) 0.087** 0.014 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
dem (0) 0.147*** 0.319*** 0.172***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Observatio 947 1,129 1,070 947 1,129 1,070 947 1,129 1,070 947 1,129 1,070 947 1,129 1,070
R‐squared 0.726 0.731 0.73 0.796 0.808 0.797
Left Censor 109 171 187 109 171 187 109 171 187
Right Censor 214 232 173 214 232 173 214 232 173
TABLE 3 ‐ Results with Freedom House 
OLS FE OLS Tobit Two sided Wooldridge
Dependent variable is Freedom House Measure of Democracy25 
 
TABLE 4: Results with Polity 2 and Vanhanen measures of democracy 
 
Note: Estimation results using PWT 6.3, and Maddison income data with Polity2 and Vanhanen 
democracy measures, as indicated. Estimation by ordinary least squares, with country fixed effects 
excluded and included, Tobit regression, Two-sided censored panel estimator, and Wooldridge dynamic 
panel estimator as indicated. See text for details. Standard errors in parentheses: errors are robust and 
clustered by countries for all estimations except Two sided.  *** indicates statistical significance at 1% 
confidence level, ** at 5% confidence level, and *** at 10% confidence level. Country and time fixed 
effect estimates suppressed, but available upon request. 
 
  
penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison
PANEL I
dem (t‐1) 0.813*** 0.795*** 0.438*** 0.459*** 0.424*** 0.445*** 0.476*** 0.506*** 0.566*** 0.573***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
inc (t‐1) 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.015 0.017 0.054* 0.069** 0.068* 0.078* 0.064** 0.065**





Observations 1,015 1,067 1,015 1,067 1,015 1,067 1,015 1,067 1,015 1,067
R‐squared 0.76 0.763 0.824 0.822
L e f t _ c e n s o r e d 3 63 8 3 63 8 3 63 8
Right_censored 196 190 196 190 196 190
PANEL II
dem (t‐1) 0.846*** 0.804*** 0.330*** 0.356*** 0.306*** 0.331*** 0.302*** 0.318*** 0.526*** 0.530***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
inc (t‐1) 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.022** 0.030** 0.030** 0.034** 0.024*** 0.031***





Observations 1,127 1,082 1,127 1,082 1,127 1,082 1,127 1,082 1,127 1,079
R‐squared 0.807 0.804 0.871 0.861
Left_censored 381 424 381 424 381 424
R i g h t _ c e n s o r e d 00 00 00
Dependent variable is Vanhanen measure of democracy
TABLE 4 ‐ Results with Polity2 and Vanhanen Index
OLS FE OLS TOBIT Two Sides Wooldridge
Dependent variable is Polity2 measure of democracy26 
 
TABLE 5: Results with Binary DD measure of democracy 
 
Note: Estimation results using PWT 6.3, and Maddison income data as indicated with binary Democracy-
dictatorship measure. Estimation by ordinary least squares, with country fixed effects excluded and 
included, unconditional and conditional Logit estimation, and Wooldridge dynamic panel estimator as 
indicated. See text for details. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistical significance at 1% confidence level, ** at 5% confidence level, and *** at 10% confidence 
level. Country and time fixed effect estimates suppressed, but available upon request. 
  
penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison penn 6.3 maddison
dem (t‐1) 0.772*** 0.734*** 0.343*** 0.381*** 0.876** 1.626*** 0.719** 1.329*** 2.758*** 3.139***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.43) (0.46) (0.34) (0.33) (0.42) (0.38)
inc (t‐1) 0.038*** 0.061*** 0.062 0.07 2.835** 3.741*** 2.155*** 2.957*** 1.516*** 1.409**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (1.26) (1.11) (0.80) (0.78) (0.59) (0.59)




Observations 1,142 1,093 1,142 1,093 431 466 431 466 1,142 1,093
R‐squared 0.683 0.662 0.772 0.747
TABLE 5 ‐ Results with binary Dem‐Dict 





Notes: dependent variable is democracy, measured as specified in column headings. Reported estimates 
for lagged income. NL estimators are Unconditional Tobit for Freedom House, Polity2 and Vanhanen; 
Unconditional Logit for DD. WE is Wooldridge estimator. Robust standard errors clustered across 
countries are in parenthesis. 1 year panel specification includes 5 lags on democracy and income; reported 
figure is prob>F for the joint significance of the 5 lags on income. Socialist countries are defined as 
Marxist in 1982 according to Lasker, from the Bollen data set. Oil Exporters are defines as the 10 
countries with high ratio of Oil Exportation to GDP, from Ross 2001. Specification includes lagged 
democracy as well country and time fixed effects; coefficient estimates for these are suppressed but 
available upon request.    
est. inc. coef. s.e. obs. coef. s.e. obs. coef. s.e. obs. coef. s.e. obs.
NL p63 3684 4594 5101 1982
NL mad 3262 4892 4968 2137
NL p63 0.102* (0.06) 545 0.099* (0.05) 497 0.039** (0.02) 552 3.726** (1.52) 189
NL mad 0.151** (0.07) 535 0.116** (0.06) 542 0.049** (0.02) 551 4.665*** (1.61) 221
WE p63 0.0328 (0.06) 545 0.153*** (0.05) 497 0.0341** (0.01) 552 1.387** (0.67) 559
WE mad 0.0919 (0.06) 535 0.0982** (0.05) 542 0.0469*** (0.02) 551 1.148* (0.63) 557
NL p63 0.079** (0.04) 1,053 0.055* (0.03) 944 0.021** (0.01) 1,050 2.582** (1.20) 399
NL mad 0.111*** (0.04) 956 0.077** (0.04) 955 0.033** (0.01) 964 3.289*** (1.06) 421
WE p63 0.0720** (0.03) 1,053 0.0634** (0.03) 944 0.0237*** (0.01) 1,050 1.504** (0.60) 1,065
WE mad 0.0823** (0.03) 956 0.0717*** (0.03) 955 0.0331*** (0.01) 964 1.389** (0.58) 975
NL p63 0.044 (0.04) 1,075 0.054* (0.03) 966 0.021** (0.01) 1,075 2.354* (1.32) 423
NL mad 0.094** (0.04) 1,016 0.069** (0.03) 1,011 0.030** (0.01) 1,026 3.754*** (1.15) 458
WE p63 0.048 (0.03) 1,075 0.075*** (0.03) 966 0.022** (0.01) 1,075 1.232** (0.59) 1,088























Freedom House Polity2 Vanhanen Dem/Dict
Sample is each 1 year 1960‐2000 with t‐5 in 1955
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